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In its waning days, the Clinton administration decided that it was appropriate to 
regulate mercury emissions from power plants, but left the specifics of that task to the 
incoming Bush administration.  
 
The Bush administration considered two approaches for regulating mercury 
emissions from power plants.  The first was to establish uniform emission rates across 
existing utilities, and more restrictive emission rates for new utilities.  The second was to 
establish less restrictive emission standards for new and existing sources, and to also 
establish a cap on mercury emissions while allowing emissions trading in order to reduce 
the cost of achieving the goal. 
 
This paper makes two contributions. First, we summarize the costs and benefits of 
controlling mercury emissions from power plants under the two approaches. We find that, 
for both approaches, the benefits of the mercury regulation are likely to fall far short of 
the cost. However, the emissions trading proposal is roughly $15 billion less expensive 
than the command-and-control proposal. Second, we examine the role of politics and 
economics in the determination of environmental policy. n its waning days after the 2000 election,
the Clinton administration decided to initiate an
expensive plan to regulate mercury emissions
from power plants. The decision culminated a
lengthy process that began with the 1990 Clean Air
Act Amendments, which required the Environ-
mental Protection Agency to evaluate mercury and
other toxic emissions to determine if they warranted more
stringent regulation.
The Clinton administration had earlier dragged its feet on
completing that analysis. But after environmental groups filed
suit over the inactivity, the administration agreed to make a
determination on mercury regulation by December 15, 2000.
In a settlement agreement, the administration stipulated that
if mercury were to be regulated, a final rule would be issued by
December 2004—a date that was later extended to March 2005. 
This created a difficult situation for the incoming Bush
administration. While there are thought to be some identifiable
economic benefits from regulating mercury emissions, such as
an increase in IQ levels in children, it is not clear that the ben-
efits of regulation justify the cost. But even if the expected ben-
efits fall far short of the expected costs, the Bush White House
was under political pressure to formulate a concrete propos-
al for regulating emissions. Any decision to move away from
regulating mercury would have to reverse the Clinton admin-
istration’s determination that such regulations are “appropri-
ate and necessary.”
The 15-year saga that concluded with the Bush administra-
tion’s mercury rule offers insights into the politics and eco-
nomics of environmental regulation. The mercury saga also
illustrates several policy lessons for future regulation.
LAW AND ECONOMICS 101
In 1990, President George H. W. Bush signed into law several
far-reaching amendments to the federal Clean Air Act. The
president had said he wanted a new law and he got one. And
even though the environmentalists gave him little credit for the
legislation, it likely would not have moved forward without his
support.
The new amendments had some desirable and undesirable
features from an economist’s perspective. On the plus side, the
legislation mandated that reductions in sulfur dioxide emis-
sions were to be accomplished using a market-based approach
that features emissions trading. The basic idea, suggested over
four decades ago, is to put a cap on the overall level of emissions
that were allowed, but to permit firms to trade emission rights
in order to achieve the goal in the least costly manner. Although
the legislation explicitly states that the allowances to pollute are
not property rights, a key reason the trading program reduces
costs is that the market treats the allowances as such.
The trading program was the major piece of good eco-
nomic news in the act. The legislation, however, contained a
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number of undesirable economic features. It did not have a
requirement, for example, that benefits exceed costs when
developing regulations—indeed, in setting overall air quali-
ty standards, the epa is forbidden from even considering
costs. The legislation also contained a number of mandates
in which the benefits of regulation were not likely to exceed
the costs. One example is the regulation of ozone, which con-
tributes to smog. A second example is the new provision to
regulate toxic air emissions like mercury. The act requires the
epa to determine whether it is “appropriate and necessary”
















METHYLMERCURY As any chemistry student should know,
mercury is nasty stuff. You do not want to break an old glass
thermometer and let the mercury bead up on the floor for some
child to touch. But the mercury coming from smokestacks is
different because humans are likely to be exposed to much
smaller concentrations. Indeed, mercury coming from smoke-
stacks poses a risk only after it is converted by bacteria into
methylmercury and then accumulates in fish tissue as it moves
up the food chain. (For more discussion of this issue, see
“Methylmercury Madness,” p. 7.)
The act established a timeline for the epa to decide
whether and how to regulate mercury emissions from coal-
burning electric utilities. After delaying this determination,
the Clinton administration was sued and ultimately agreed to
make the determination by December 15, 2000. That meant
the decision would not come until after the 2000 election,
which resulted in George W. Bush’s defeat of Bill Clinton’s vice
president, Al Gore. At that date, the Clinton White House
decided that it was “appropriate and necessary” to regulate
mercury under the section of the act that requires costly com-
mand-and-control regulations. 
Faced with this determination and with a December 2003
deadline to formulate a specific regulation, the Bush adminis-
tration decided to propose two regulatory options. One was to
offer the command-and-control option designated by the act,
which would require Maximum Available Control Technolo-
gy (mact). The second proposal was a “cap-and-trade”
approach that involved putting a cap on mercury emissions
and then allowing trading. Because the cap-and-trade approach
falls under a different section of the act, the Bush administra-
tion proposed reversing the Clinton administration’s deter-
mination that it is “appropriate and necessary” to use mactto
regulate mercury.
COSTS AND BENEFITS In the Bush epa’s preliminary pro-
posal, there was no serious analysis of the costs and benefits
of either option. We conducted that analysis ourselves, and the
results are summarized in Table 1. The costs and benefits
assume that, without the mercury regulation, sulfur dioxide
and nitrogen oxides emissions from power plants would still
be subject to another rule offered by the Bush administration.
We use this as our baseline because, when the epa first pro-
posed the cap-and-trade approach to mercury regulation, it
stated that it “dovetails well” with the cap-and-trade rule on sul-
fur dioxide and nitrogen oxides. Both rules were proposed at
the same time, and the sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides rule
was finalized just before the release of the mercury rule.
Table 1 reveals two interesting points. First, the command-
and-control option appears to be very expensive relative to the
cap-and-trade option. In present-value terms, it is about $15
billion more expensive (in 2004 dollars), depending on which
discount rate is selected. Second, the benefits from reducing
mercury emissions from power plants are about an order of
magnitude less than the costs of the cap-and-trade program.
Benefits are about $100 million and the costs of the cap-and-
trade program are about $4 billion. 
Our benefit numbers are based on a series of calculations
that link emissions from power plants to changes in IQ. The
linkage involves several steps. First, emissions from U.S. power
plants need to be linked to deposition. Second, deposition
needs to be linked to mercury concentrations in fish. Third,
mercury concentrations in fish need to be linked to fish con-
sumption by U.S. residents. Fourth, consumption of fish by U.S.
residents needs to be linked to mercury concentrations in
humans. Finally, mercury concentrations in humans need to
be linked to changes in outcome variables, such as IQ. In our
view, existing studies are not terribly conclusive on the linkage
between IQ and mercury in blood. We cannot rule out the pos-
sibility that there is no linkage at typical doses, but we assume
that there is one, following the National Research Council.
More generally, there are substantial uncertainties in all of the
steps in the estimation. We tried to consider those uncertain-
ties using sensitivity analyses. 
Our strategy for estimating benefits was to use either an esti-
mate of the central tendency or the upper bound for uncertain
assumptions. We expect, as a result, that our benefit estimate
is biased upward. We did a sensitivity analysis of our results and
found that in no cases did the quantifiable benefits exceed the
quantifiable costs. Of course, it is possible that we left out some-
thing important. Some have claimed, for example, that there is
a connection between blood mercury levels
and heart disease. We did not include that
and other alleged benefits because we did
not think the current state of science justi-
fies it. One study suggests those benefits
could be substantial, but notes that the link-
age has not been established at a reasonable
level of certainty. In its final mercury rule,
the epa also concluded that those effects
were not clearly established and warranted
additional research before incorporating in
a regulatory analysis. 
FINAL  RULE After we completed our
analysis, the Bush epa came out with its
final rule. The rule basically adopted the
cap-and-trade proposal that was included
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Value of Benefits, Costs, and Net Benefits
From Proposed Clean Air Mercury Rules (in billions of 2004 dollars)
MACT Cap and Trade
Benefits Cost Net Benefits Benefits Cost Net Benefits
3% $0.082-$0.14 $21 ($21) $0.086-$0.15 $5.5 ($5.4)-($5.3)
5% $0.070-$0.12 $18 ($18)–($17) $0.068-$0.12 $4.3 ($4.3)-($4.2)
7% $0.063-$0.11 $15 ($15) $0.058-$0.10 $3.4 ($3.4)–($3.3)
Notes: Numbers are rounded to two significant digits. Cost estimates computed by Charles River Associates. Paren-
theses indicate negative values. Net benefits equal benefits minus costs. For details of benefit calculations, see
“Designing Environmental Policy: Lessons from the Regulation of Mercury Emissions,” by Ted Gayer and Robert
W. Hahn. AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Regulatory Analysis05-01 (revised March 2005).
Discount
Ratein the proposed rule, but with a few important changes. First,
it reduced the level of reductions required in the first phase of
the program, allowing 38 tons per year rather than 34 tons. Sec-
ond, it got rid of the provision known as the safety valve, which
set a ceiling price of $2,187 per mercury allowance. With the
safety valve, power plants are given the option of purchasing
additional allowances above the cap from
the federal government. This safety valve
was meant to hedge against any unexpect-
ed increases in the price of mercury reduc-
tions. It was designed to sustain long-term
environmental protection by reducing
future allowances by an amount equal to
the number of allowances sold by the fed-
eral government.
The epadid a benefit-cost analysis of its
final Clean Air Mercury Rule, the results of
which are summarized in Table 2. The
agency presents annual estimates of both
costs and benefits in the year 2020. The
results are not directly comparable with
Table 1 because we provide present value estimates of benefits
and costs for 2005 through 2020. For the year 2020, our costs are
very similar to the epa’s, but our benefits are about one order of
magnitude higher than theirs. The reason our benefit estimates
are higher is that we assume, conservatively, that benefits result
as soon as mercury emissions are reduced and that mercury
emissions reductions will reduce mercury concentrations in all
fish caught in U. S. oceans and lakes. The epaassumes a lag time
of five to 50 years before benefits occur and assumes that emis-
sions reductions will only significantly affect human mercury
exposure in the United States from the consumption of fresh-
water, recreationally caught fish. Still, the bottom line is that the
epaanalysis arrives at the same qualitative result—the benefits
of the regulation are not likely to justify the costs.
MERCURY POLITICS
Since leaving office, former Clinton epa administrator Carol
Browner has forcefully called for the stringent regulation of
mercury emissions from power plants. However, for the eight
years that she ran the agency, Browner’s epadid nothing sub-
stantive to address mercury emissions from power plants. Only
in its final days, after being prodded by a lawsuit, did it issue a
decision—and that decision left the actual rulemaking to the
incoming Bush administration. One wonders, then, why
Browner did not choose to regulate power plant emissions of
what she later called “one of the most potent health threats in
the environment, posing particular risks to children and devel-
oping fetuses.” We suspect politics could provide at least a par-
tial explanation for the decision to highlight the mercury issue
after leaving office rather than while serving as administrator. 
Politics is also a useful prism through which to understand
the debate about how many newborns might be at risk. For
example, the New York Timesreported that government scien-
tists suggested that 630,000 babies born each year “might have
been exposed as fetuses to unsafe levels of mercury.” To under-
stand the alleged basis for that number, you need to understand
the concept of a reference dose, which is the basis of the
“unsafe” level mentioned above. The epaestablished a reference
dose of 5.8 parts per billion blood mercury concentration in
women of child-bearing age as a measure of exposure that
places children at an increased risk of adverse health effects.
The National Research Council (NRC) subsequently examined
the studies of mercury health effects and supported the epa’s
reference dose for mercury. 
The reference dose is grounded in a number of conserva-
tive assumptions that, taken together, likely overstate the seri-
ousness of the mercury problem. The starting point for deriv-
ing the reference dose is to estimate the benchmark dose,
which is the lowest maternal blood mercury concentration
expected to lead to a five percent increase in adverse health
outcomes to children.
Even though one study found no adverse health effects from
maternal mercury exposure to fetuses, the NRC focused on
another study that did find an effect in order to determine the
benchmark dose at 85 parts per billion. For precautionary pur-
poses, the NRC then used the 95 percent lower confidence limit
of the benchmark dose to arrive at a benchmark lower dose of
58 parts per billion. The NRC study then applied an addition-
al safety factor by dividing the benchmark lower dose by 10,
which leads to the reference dose of 5.8 parts per billion. Thus,
the reference dose is much lower than the blood mercury level
that has been found to result in significant adverse health out-
comes in children.
A study by the Centers for Disease Control found that
approximately 7.8 percent of women of child-bearing age sam-
pled in 1999 and 2000 had blood mercury levels above the ref-
erence dose. Given approximately four million births in the
United States each year, this means that approximately 300,000
newborns are likely to be born from women who have blood
mercury levels above the reference dose. Some scientists have
claimed that, in fact, approximately 630,000 newborns might
be at risk each year. Interestingly, the press picked up this num-
ber uncritically in reporting on the issue. 
The Timesstatement is misleading in a number of ways. First,
it uses the word “might,” which is fairly weak, but is attached to
the number 630,000, which gives the impression of a serious
health problem. A critical flaw is that scientists generally fail to
attach any probability to the 300,000 or 630,000 estimates. Sec-
T TA A B BL LE E 2 2
EPA’s Monetized Annual Benefits
Benefits, Costs, and Net Benefits of Final Clean Air Mercury Rule in 2020*
Discount Rate Benefits Cost Net Benefits
3% $1.9-$3.4 $180 ($180)
7% $0.9-$2.3 $1,000 ($1,000)
Notes: Numbers are rounded to two significant digits and represent annualized benefits and costs anticipated
in 2020. Parentheses indicate negative values. Net benefits equal benefits minus costs.
*In millions of 2004 dollars.
Source: Environmental Protection Agency
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ond, the reference dose is likely to be very conservative in the sense
of overstating what might be reasonably thought of as a safe dose.
Finally, the upward adjustment from 300,000 to over 600,000 was
based on findings that mercury levels in fetal cord blood are high-
er than in maternal blood. However, this relationship was already
accounted for as part of the uncertainty factor in the original der-
ivation of the reference dose. Interestingly, no one in the main-
stream press picked that up. 
But the story gets better. Whereas the study by the Centers
for Disease Control found that 7.8 percent of women of child-
bearing age have blood mercury levels above the reference
dose, a follow-up sample in 2001 and 2002 found that only 3.9
percent are above the reference dose. If one accepts the refer-
ence dose and uses the more recent data by the Centers for Dis-
ease Control on blood mercury levels, the claims of 300,000
children at risk should be adjusted downward to less than
200,000. To our knowledge, this factoid never made it into the
general debate. Imagine the press reporting that the number of
children at risk went down by over 150,000 using more-recent
data—another “dog-bites-man” story.
The implication is not that the reference dose is unimportant.
Rather, there are three key points: First, the reference dose con-
tains a number of conservative assumptions regarding risk. Sec-
ond, the numbers bandied about in the mainstream media were
simply wrong and probably substantially overstated the risk, but
they were taken as gospel. Third, no one in the political debate
seems to have cared very much about the core problem that econ-
omists tend to focus on—which is whether the economic bene-
fits of the proposed action were likely to justify the costs. 
Beyond reference doses and children at risk, there was the
normal interest group politics surrounding this debate. Many
environmental interest groups backed a proposal that called for
a 90 percent reduction in mercury emissions. There is no reli-
able modeling information on the costs of such a proposal.
However, given that the costs of removing mercury are likely
to increase more than proportionately with greater reductions,
while the benefits increase proportionately, any alternative plan
to further reduce mercury would probably impose greater net
costs than the ones already proposed. 
Industry responded by saying the epa’s proposed rule will
have higher costs to society than benefits. They argued that
more research should be done before we finalize expensive reg-
ulations, citing the uncertainty surrounding the impact of mer-
cury on intelligence and the fact that commercially available
technology that would meet the epa’s mercury standards does
not exist currently. 
BROADER LESSONS
There are a number of lessons that can be drawn from the epa’s
proposed regulation of mercury. Here we offer six:
 When the benefits from a policy intervention are likely to be
“small,” the probability that the regulation will make matters
worse should be carefully considered prior to intervention.
Consider the problem of regulating mercury from
power plants. The benefits of regulating such emissions
are likely to be small. According to our conservative risk
parameter estimates, if mercury emissions from U.S.
power plants were completely eliminated, IQ scores
could be expected to increase by an average of 0.012
points per newborn. That is an upper bound of benefits
because the new regulation of sulfur dioxide and nitro-
gen oxides from power plants will reduce some mercu-
ry emissions independent of the mercury rule, and
because the incremental reductions from the mercury
rule in any year amount to no more than 37.5 percent of
total current emissions. Our calculations suggest that
the benefits are not likely to exceed the costs. 
Unfortunately, the case of mercury is not all that
unusual. The expected net benefits of many policy
interventions are negative, particularly when an issue
has achieved some political salience. The bottom line is
that not all problems are worth addressing, so we need
to separate the important ones from the less important,
or even trivial, ones.
 Problems that are global in scope could require an interna-
tional regulatory response. Mercury has many characteris-
tics of a global public bad. Most of the emissions from
local sources go into a global reservoir and are not
deposited domestically. And a significant fraction of
domestic fish consumption contains mercury that is
unrelated to domestic activity. This suggests that if mer-
cury were viewed as a problem worth addressing, it is
probably best to figure out some kind of global, or at
least multinational, response. 
The question is whether an agreement is needed to
control emissions of mercury. We have not done a
detailed calculation, but we suspect that the benefits are
not likely to outweigh the costs of controlling mercury
emissions in many developed and developing countries.
The reason is that of the 5,000 to 5,500 tons of annual
mercury emissions worldwide, the epa estimates that
only about 40 percent come from current anthro-
pogenic sources. Another 40 percent comes from the
recycling of mercury already in the environment as a
result of past natural emissions and human activities.
The remaining 20 percent comes from natural sources.
A complete shutdown of all worldwide coal-fired power
plants, incinerators, and factories would reduce mercu-
ry emissions by less than 40 percent.
 In general, framing policies too narrowly, as in the case of
mercury, runs the risk of suboptimal responses. The epa ini-
tially claimed that the primary benefits of its proposals
to regulate mercury emissions came from reductions in
other pollutants that contribute to the formation of fine
particles. But if that were the case, then regulators should
focus directly on the problem of regulating fine particles
and its precursor pollutants rather than trying to control
those emissions in a roundabout way. Moreover, the key
pollutants that contribute to fine particles are already
capped under a different rule, so regulating mercury will
not lead to additional reductions.  Policymakers should not assume that the introduction of
market-based approaches will necessarily improve economic
welfare. Many economists, including the authors of this
article, believe that market-based approaches to pollu-
tion control can provide a viable, cost-effective way of
achieving environmental goals. At the same time, there
is the possibility that the introduction of a market-based
approach could reduce economic welfare. The problem
arises if, for example, an economically inefficient regu-
lation would not have been implemented were it not for
the existence of a market-based approach. While this
was likely not the case for mercury regulation, it is a
consideration. The deeper problem that needs to be
considered in evaluating policy options is identifying
the relevant counterfactual for assessing the efficiency
gains from a policy.
 Care should be taken to use expected values, rather than
conservative assumptions, where they are available in setting a
safe dose.In many cases, it may not be possible to define
a “safe” dose in the sense of being 100 percent safe for
all people. If guesses and estimates need to be made,
they should be stated explicitly. By focusing on worst-
case scenarios, there is a real danger that society will
allocate considerable resources chasing after negligi-
ble or nonexistent health risks. Indeed, the use of a ref-
erence dose for mercury, based on conservative
assumptions, may have the unintended consequence
of increasing risk by reducing the amount of healthy
fish consumed.
 Policymakers should identify the impacts of a regulation in
clear economic terms so that interested parties have time to com-
ment before the regulation is finalized. The epa was required
by Executive Order 12866 to do a cost-benefit analysis
when it made its initial regulatory proposals on mercury.
That it chose to wait until the final rule to consider issu-
ing a quantitative analysis is bad for the policy process.
We understand that the White House, for political rea-
sons, may not have wanted to publicize analyses indicat-
ing that the benefits of their proposed policy were likely
to fall short of the costs, but that is no reason not to com-
ply with the executive order. 
CONCLUSION
This article provided an overview of the costs and benefits of
regulating mercury emissions from power plants using IQ
gains as a measure of benefits. Our assessment suggests strong-
ly that the benefits are not likely to be worth the costs. This is
true both for the command-and-control regulatory regime that
was proposed as well as the market-based regulatory regime
that was ultimately adopted. However, the market-based
approach could reduce the costs of achieving the emissions
goal by about $15 billion dollars. 
While, on the surface, this appears to be a good outcome, it
is uncertain whether that is truly the case. If the market-based
approach is what made this regulation politically feasible, it may
be imposing net costs on society. If, on the other hand, we would
have had a command-and-control regulation like the one the epa
originally proposed, the market-based approach increases net
economic welfare. Thus, the baseline for comparison is of para-
mount importance in assessing welfare effects.
As a society, we are in real danger of focusing on very small
risks if they become salient political issues. The regulation of
mercury emissions from power plants is one such example. We
are likely to spend billions of dollars on reducing mercury emis-
sions from power plants and getting very modest, if any,
improvements in IQ scores in return.
In his now-classic book Breaking the Vicious Circle, Justice
Stephen Breyer explores some of the fundamental problems
with environmental, health, and safety regulation and also
examines some ways to fix those problems. A similar exercise
is undertaken in Philip Howard’s best-seller The Death of Com-
mon Sense. Both authors come to the conclusion that the cur-
rent regulatory system is broken, observing that we regulate in
ways that are suboptimal from an economics point of view. In
particular, we often regulate trivial risks.
The question, of course, is how to fix the problem. We do
not believe this problem has a global fix that is politically fea-
sible. One of our preferred fixes would involve two steps:
First, limit the government’s scope for regulation to those
areas where a significant market failure can be demonstrat-
ed; and second, have a requirement that the policy inter-
vention be likely to do substantially more good than harm.
In computing net benefits, it is also important that risk esti-
mates be based on health effects that reflect the state of sci-
entific knowledge. 
Based on our proposed fix, it is unlikely that government
would have decided to regulate mercury under either of the
proposals. Even if a significant market failure could have
been demonstrated in this case, it is highly unlikely that the
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proposed policy interventions could be shown to do more
good than harm. 
To the extent there was a failure here, it was a failure of a dif-
ferent kind. The regulation of mercury appears to be a case in
which the strategic use of the courts helped yield outcomes that
are economically inefficient. Several scholars have noted how
courts frequently yield regulatory results that are far from effi-
cient, particularly in the field of environmental regulation.
Of course, the final regulation also is a direct result of the
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, which call for regulation of
toxic air emissions with little regard to balancing benefits and
costs in most situations. Given the highly prescriptive language
contained in parts of the act, it will be interesting to see if the
market-based approach contained in the Bush administration’s
final rule withstands court challenges.
The final mercury rule, like many regulations, represents
a political compromise. The Clinton administration, recog-
nizing that its days were numbered, made it virtually impos-
sible not to do something on regulating mercury from power
plants. The Bush administration’s actions can reasonably be
interpreted as making the best of a bad political and eco-
nomic situation.
There is one significant silver lining in the Bush rule. If the
cap-and-trade system goes ahead as planned, it will show that
it is possible to design an emission
trading system that works for a so-
called “toxic” air pollutant. Up until this
point, the environmental community
had been fairly successful in arguing
that such toxics should not be traded.
If the mercury trading system is suc-
cessful in environmental and eco-
nomic terms, it may help pave the way
for the trading of other air toxics where
trading can be justified. 
Furthermore, the current Bush
administration, by promoting market-
based approaches for controlling partic-
ulates and mercury, has cemented the
environmental legacy of the first Presi-
dent Bush. That president’s crowning
environmental achievement was to help
introduce the market-based approach for
addressing acid rain. In the future, politi-
cians of all stripes will find it easier to
embrace such market-based approaches
where they may be sensible either for
political and/or economic reasons. 
We conclude with one final obser-
vation that George Stigler made in this
journal more than two decades ago.
He noted that citizens may not want a
government or regulatory apparatus
that focuses on making the most eco-
nomically efficient use of society’s lim-
ited resources. (See “Economists and
Public Policy,” May/June 1982.) We
think Stigler was correct then and is
still correct today. 
Nonetheless, when resource misal-
locations are substantial, we think it
behooves our elected officials, as well as
our fellow voters, to understand the
implications of their decisions. Spend-
ing several billion dollars to reduce emis-
sions that are likely to yield few social
benefits means that we have several bil-
lion dollars less to spend on things that
could do a lot more good. R
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